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Abstract. Proof-carrying-code was proposed as a solution to ensure a
trust relationship between two parties: a (heavyweight) analyzer and a
(lightweight) checker. The analyzer verifies the conformance of a given
application to a specified property and generates a certificate attesting
the validity of the analysis result. It suffices then for the checker just
to test the consistency of the proof instead of constructing it. We set
out to study the applicability of this technique in the context of data-
flow analysis. In particular, we want to know if there is a significant
performance difference between the analyzer and the checker. Therefore,
we developed a tool, called DCert, implementing an inter-procedural
context and flow-sensitive data-flow analyzer and checker for Android.
Applying our tool to real-world large applications, we found out that
checking can be up to 8 times faster than verification. This important
gain in time suggests a potential for equipping applications on app stores
with certificates that can be checked on mobile devices which are limited
in computation and storage resources. We describe our implementation
and report on experimental results.
1 Introduction
Static data-flow analysis has proven its effectiveness in assessing the security
of Android applications by identifying data leaks [1, 5, 13, 16, 17, 20, 30]. Once
we want to install an application on a mobile device, how can we trust the
outcome of these tools? The analysis might be broken, or a (malicious) tool
can provide a false claim on purpose. Alternatively, it is impractical to directly
run the analysis on mobile devices due to scalability issues with static analysis,
which is even exacerbated when additional limitations on computing and storage
resources are imposed.
Proof-carrying-code provides a solution to this problem by ensuring a trust
relationship between two parties: a (heavyweight) analyzer and a (lightweight)
checker. The analyzer verifies the conformance of a given application to a spec-
ified property and generates a certificate attesting the validity of the analysis
result. It suffices then for the checker just to test the consistency of the proof
instead of constructing it. So far, its applicability has not been studied in the
context of data-flow analysis applied to real-world programs. In particular, we
want to know if there is a significant performance gain in checking an applica-
tion compared to analysing it. Hence, we propose a proof-carrying-code inspired
data-flow analysis for Android. It has most of commonly desirable features, such
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as context and flow-sensitivity, conservative handling of aliases and modular-
ity (inter-procedural). In addition, our analysis generates a checkable certificate
that is context-independent, thanks to our bottom-up analysis. Hence, a library
certificate can be re-used in other applications, provided that the code did not
change.
We implemented our approach in a tool called DCert and applied it to real-
world large applications. We found out that checking can be up to 8 times
faster than verification. This significant time saving, suggests a new security
model for app stores by equipping applications with certificates an deploying
lightweight checkers on mobile devices. Our contributions can be summarized in
the following:
– Proposition of certification scheme for data-flow analysis. We are not aware
of any other tool that generates a certificate and is scalable to real-world
large applications.
– Implementation of our approach in a tool called DCert.
– Providing empirical evidence of the feasibility of our approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates our
approach via an example. Section 3 and 4 provide details of our technique and its
ingredients. Section 5 describes our implementation and reports on experimental
results. Finally, Section 6 surveys related work before concluding with Section 7.
2 Example
We start by illustrating our idea through an example. Consider the simple code
in Figure 1 as part of an Android application. To ease the presentation, we
omit irrelevant details. We have the root procedure foo which makes call to
function bar which, in turn, calls procedures getId, Send and getNumber. Func-
tion getId reads the device identifier using the API method getDeviceId at
line 5. Similarly, function getNumber returns the number of the actual phone
making call to the API method getLine1Number at line 5. Finally, procedure
Send is used to send the string it takes as argument as an SMS via API method
sendTextMessage at line 7. Both methods getDeviceId and getLine1Number
represent sources and sendTextMessage is a sink. We want to verify if our app
leaks information from certain sources to certain sinks.
Analysis and Certificate Generation. Our analysis attempts to find all data
leaks, i.e., paths leading from sources to sinks. In addition, it outputs a certificate
corroborating its outcome.
Let us use id and num to respectively refer to the sources getDeviceId and
getLine1Number. We also write sms to refer to the sink sendTextMessage. Our
analysis computes a summary for each function, which consists of a set of pairs
(x, y) expressing the existence of a data-flow from y to x. A summary of a given
procedure only includes elements visible outside of it. Hence, local variables
will not appear in a summary. During the analysis, when a function is invoked
1 String foo()
2 {
3 String x = bar ();
4 return x;
5 }
1 String getId ()
2 {
3 // get manager
4 TelephonyManager tm = ...;
5 String x = tm.getDeviceId ();
6 return x;
7 }
1 String bar()
2 {
3 String x = getId ();
4 Send(x);
5 String y = getNumber ();
6 return y;
7 }
1 String getNumber(String x)
2 {
3 // get manager
4 TelephonyManager tm = ...;
5 String x = tm.getLine1Number ();
6 return x;
7 }
1 void Send(String x)
2 {
3 // destination phone number
4 String num = "...";
5 // get manager
6 SmsManager SM = ...;
7 SM.sendTextMessage(num , null , x, ...);
8 }
Fig. 1: Simple Java example illustrating potential data flows from sources to
sinks. Method getDeviceId is an Android method for obtaining the device
identifier, method getLine1Number permits to obtain the phone number and
sendTextMessage allows to send text messages (SMS).
from another one, its summary is used instead of re-analysing it. This process
is iterated until a fix-point is reached. For illustration, consider Figure 2. It
shows the summary computed for the different methods of our previous example
(Figure 1) at each iteration. Initially (iteration 0), all function summaries are
empty. After iteration 1, empty summaries are still associated with procedures
foo and bar, however, summaries for procedures getId, getNumber and Send are
updated. The symbol ret models the return value of a method. Hence, summaries
(ret, id) and (ret, num), respectively, express flows of the phone identifier (in
getId) and the phone number (in getNumber) to a return statement. Similarly,
(sms, x) expresses the presence of a data-flow from the argument x of procedure
Send to the sink sms. After iteration 2, the summary for procedure bar is updated
as summaries associated with its callees changed in the previous step (iteration
1), meaning potential new data flows. For example, (sms, id) is due to the path
Iteration
0 1 2 3
foo: - - - (sms, id), (ret, num)
bar: - - (sms, id), (ret, num) (sms, id), (ret, num)
getId: - (ret, id) (ret, id) (ret, id)
getNumber: - (ret, num) (ret, num) (ret, num)
Send: - (sms, x) (sms, x) (sms, x)
Fig. 2: Iterative computation of function summaries. A pair (x, y) models a data-
flow from y to x.
Send ← x ← getId in procedure bar, where summaries of procedures Send and
getId are used. Finally, the last iteration (3) updates the summary for foo by just
propagating bar’s summary. At this state a fix-point is reached and no further
changes will be induced. The presence of (sms, id) in the summary associated
with (root) procedure foo implies a potential leak of the phone identifier via an
SMS.
The final map (iteration 3) represents a certificate. It will be returned by
the analyser. Our summaries are context-independent, thanks to our bottom-up
analysis. Hence, a summary, which also represents a certificate, for a library can
be re-used in other applications, provided that the library code is not modified.
Checking. Now the question is how can a client of the analysis trust its claim?
The analysis might contain errors or, even worst, an attacker can claim app
safety without applying the analysis at all. For this, the computed map will
serve as a certificate. To test its validity, we just need to locally check that the
summary of each method is valid by assuming the validity of the summaries of
its callees. For example, assuming the summary for bar is {(sms, id), (ret, num)},
the summary for foo must be {(sms, id), (ret, num)}, which is the case. This is
performed by the checker, which takes as input a certificate (computed map)
and an app, and answers whether the certificate is valid.
Certificate checking is lighter than certificate generation as we do not need
to compute a fix-point. Instead, it is performed in a single pass. It has a linear
complexity in the number of map entries (functions) and a constant space com-
plexity as we just perform checks without generating information that need to
be stored. In what follows, we provide more details about our approach.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we provide some ingredients required for the presentation. We
start by introducing a language that we consider along our study.
3.1 Intermediary Representation
Without loss of generality, we consider an object oriented language, accounting
for the features distinguishing it from simple imperative languages. We use a
Jimple-like [29] intermediary representation which allows us to encode most of
the language constructs using a minimal set of instructions. It has been shown
that the whole instruction set of widely deployed virtual machines, such as JVM
and Dalvik can be encoded in Jimple [6, 29]. A program is composed of a set of
methods, where the body of each method is given by the grammar below:
B ::= stmt
stmt ::= stmt; stmt | assign | jmp | label | return id
assign ::= id := c | id := id | id := op id |
id := id op id | id := id[id] | id[id] := id |
id := id.id | id.id := id | id := id(id, . . . , id)
jmp ::= if cond goto label | goto label
cond ::= id > 0 | id < 0 | id = 0
While the usual syntax for method invocation in object oriented style is o.f(. . .),
we use a simple form f(. . .), such that the receiver object is one of the function
arguments. The assignment ret = id models a return statement by copying the
retuned expression to a special variable ret. We use L to denote the language
(set of statements) generated by the grammar.
3.2 Term Representative
A key challenge faced when designing any program analysis is aliasing. As we
want our analysis to scale to large applications, we need a light but sound solution
for the aliasing problem. Therefore, we use the approach proposed by Valle´e et
al [27]. Their idea is based on the observation that only objects of compatible
types can be aliases in type-safe programming languages, such as Java. Therefore,
a type can be used as a representative for all its object instances. Another
advantage of this approach is its simplicity and ease of implementation.
We introduce the notion of representative which is a symbolic representation
(over-approximation) of a set of l-value terms that are potential aliases. An l-
value is an expression through which a memory location can be updated. In what
follows, we provide more details on the notion of representative.
Let V be the set of l-values we can have according to our grammar, i.e, simple
variables, array access (a[i]) and object field access (o.f). We define the function
R : V −→ V which takes an l-value as parameter and returns the corresponding
representative. The case where an l-value is a simple term is straightforward.
The representative of a simple term x is the term itself as Java does not permit
aliasing between simple identifiers. We have
R(x) = x if x is a simple variable
The two other cases (field and array access) require more elaboration.
Field Access Two terms o1.f and o2.f are aliases if o1 and o2 points to the
same object. Hence, all potential field access that are aliases must map to the
same representative. Observe that in type safe languages, like Java, o1.f and
o2.f can be aliases only if o1 and o2 belong to the same type hierarchy.
Given an object o whose declared type is t, we write T (o, f) to get the highest
class in the type hierarchy of t that contains the field f . One way then for over-
approximating the representative of a field access o.f is via
R(o.f) = T (o, f).f
Hence o1.f and o2.f are mapped to the same representative, provided that
the types of o1 and o2 belong to the same type hierarchy.
Array Access An l-value representing an array access also leads to aliasing.
Here the aliasing is due to two causes: reference and index. Two terms a[i] and
a[j] refer to the same memory location if i = j. In another scenario, terms a[i]
and b[i] also refer to the same memory location if a and b points to the same
array, i.e, store the same memory reference. We need to take into account both
causes of aliasing. To this end, we perform a lightweight alias analysis that split
the set of array terms into subsets of potential aliases. Given an array a, A(a)
returns the unique identifier of the alias set to which a belongs. Note that if we
define the representative of a[i] as A(a)[i], it solves the problem of reference-
induced aliasing, but does account for the index-induced one. Keeping track of
individual indexes, may lead to an infinity of terms when indexes are modified
inside a loop. Therefore, we conservatively define the representative of an array
access as
R(a[i]) = A(a)
This takes into account aliases due to index as all element of an array have the
same representative.
3.3 Control Flow Graph and Call Graph
Our analysis proceeds at the control flow graph level. Each function is associated
with a corresponding control flow graph CFG . A CFG is a directed graph (N,E)
where N is the set of pairs (`, st), such that st is a program basic statement and
` is the corresponding program location. The relation E ⊆ N ×N represents
the control-flow precedence between program statements. We introduce some
helper functions to facilitate the presentation. Function succ(n) returns the set of
successors of the node taken as argument, pred(n) returns the set of predecessors
of n, and stmt(n) returns the statement associated with the node n in CFG.
Also init(CFG) returns the initial location (without predecessors) of CFG and
final(CFG) returns the final location (without successors).
In addition to the control flow graph, representing function intra-information,
we need the call graph of the program as our analysis requires inter-information
as well. It is essential that the computed call graph is an over-approximation of
the concrete call graph, i.e., any pair of (caller, callee) in real executions of the
application is present in the call graph. Java, and object oriented languages in
general, have many features, such as method overriding. This makes the construc-
tion of an exact call graph (statically) at compile time impossible. Therefore, we
over-approximate it using the class hierarchy approach [27] which permits to
conservatively estimate the runtime types of receiver objects. In what follows,
we write CG(P ) to denote the call graph of program P . It over-approximate the
set of all possible pairs of (caller, callee) belonging to the program.
4 Data-Flow Certification
As seen in section 2, our approach has two main components: an analyzer and
a checker. The analyzer takes as input an application and produces a certifi-
cate. The checker takes as input an application and a certificate, and answers
whether the certificate is valid with respect to the input application. As we are
in the context of static analysis, a key element shared by both the analyzer and
the checker is the abstract domain on which they operate, together with the
corresponding transfer function. This is the subject of the next subsection.
4.1 Abstract Domain
A natural way for encoding inter-variable flows is through an abstract domain D
representing the powerset of pairs of l-value representatives (section 3). Hence,
aliases are taken into account in D. We also need to include symbols associated
with sources and sinks. Let SR be the set of method identifiers representing
sources and SK the set of ones representing sinks. Let us also have a function b
which takes a method identifier as argument and returns a corresponding symbol.
E.g., as we have seen previously (Section 2), b(getDeviceId) = id. Function b
naturally extends to a set of identifiers S as b(S) = {b(x) | x ∈ S}. The domain
D is then defined as
D = P({(R(x), R(y)) | x, y ∈ (V ∪ b(SR ∪ SK))}),
For consistency, we define R(x) = x if x ∈ b(SR ∪ SK), i.e., the representative
of a symbol modeling a source or a sink is the symbol itself. For a set of pairs in
D, a pair (x, y) expresses that y flows to x.
4.2 Transfer Function
To capture variable dependency relations induced by the program, we model the
effect of program basic statements, belonging to our language L, on elements
of the abstract domain D. This is achieved through function F that we define
below.
Let Lb denotes the set of basic statements in L. Given a set of facts d ∈ D
and a statement s ∈ Lb, F : D × Lb −→ D is formally defined as:
F (d, s) ={(x, y) | ∃z. (x, z) ∈ flow(s) ∧ (z, y) ∈ d} ∪ (d− kill(s, d)).
In the formula above, function flow returns the set of flows that are locally
induced by the statement taken as argument. For example flow(x := y+z) yields
{(x, y), (x, z)}. Function F transitively extends the relation represented by the
input facts d in combination with the relation induced by the input statement
s. It also uses function kill to exclude facts that are no longer valid after the
assignment. For example
F ({(x, t), (y, p)}, x := y + z) = {(x, p), (y, p)}.
As the assignment modifies variable x, the fact (x, t) no longer holds. The fact
(x, p) is obtained by transitivity from the input fact (y, p) in combination with
(x, y) which is induced by the assignment statement. We provide definitions of
functions flow and kill for the different kind of basic statements in Table 1.
Assignments to simple variables, representing the first group in Table 1, gen-
erate pairs expressing that identifiers appearing in the assignment right-hand-
side flow to its left-hand-side. For the cases id1 := id2.id3 and id1 := id2[id3],
we use the representative of the assignment left-hand-side to take aliases into
account. If the right-hand-side is a constant, no flows are generated. The return
statement return id is handled as a simple assignment ret := id, where ret is a
special variable. In all these cases, we kill input facts expressing previous flows
to the assignment left-hand-side.
In case of an assignment to an object field or array element (second group),
we use the representative of the assignment left-hand-side to take aliases into
account. However, we do not kill any fact to preserve soundness. Indeed, a rep-
resentative is an over-approximation of possible aliases. Therefore, the updated
l-value may or may not be an actual alias of a given fact.
For a function call (third group), we first extract its summary (summary[f ]),
which is the set of facts expressing the flows induced by the function over pro-
gram variables. We then replace formal parameters of the function with the
corresponding actual ones in each fact. We also replace the special variable ret
with the actual return-to variable r. Note that summaries for functions are com-
puted iteratively, on-the-fly, during the analysis as we will see later.
Finally, a conditional cond does not have any effect on the input facts, making
the transfer function F behave as an identity function. In the next subsections,
we present the core components of our approach: analyser and checker.
4.3 The analyser
In what follows, we describe the algorithm that performs the data-flow analysis.
A key feature of our algorithm is that it produces a certificate.
To compute all possible flows from sources to sinks, we propose a bottom-up
inter-procedural data-flow analysis that computes method summaries that are
context-independent. A summary is an over-approximation of the relation en-
tailed by a given method over l-values used in the program. Our inter-procedural
analysis is implemented via algorithm Analyser (Algorithm 1), which takes as in-
put a program P and produces a certificate that consists of the summary map.
Statement: st flow(st) kill(st, d)
id := c ∅ {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id}
id1 := id2 {(id1, id2)} {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id1}
id1 := op id2 {(id1, id2)} {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id1}
id1 := id2 op id3 {(id1, id2), (id1, id3)} {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id1}
id1 := id2.id3 {(id1, R(id2.id3))} {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id1}
id1 := id2[id3] {(id1, R(id2[id3]))} {(x, y) ∈ d | x = id1}
return id {(ret, id)} ∅
id1.id2 := id3 {(R(id1.id2), id3)} ∅
id1[id2] := id3 {(R(id1[id2]), id3)} ∅
r = f(id1, . . . , idn) s[id1/x1 . . . , idn/xn, r/ret] d− {(x, y) ∈ d | x = r}
(s = summary[f]
and x1, . . . , xn are formal parameters of f)
cond ∅ ∅
Table 1: Definition of functions flow and kill for the different kind of basic state-
ments considered in our language.
Algorithm 1: Analyzer
Input: Program P
Output: map from methods to sets of facts (certificate)
1 Var map summary;
2 Var list WL;
3 WL := {methods of P};
4 foreach m ∈WL do
5 summary[m] = {};
6 while WL 6= ∅ do
7 m := Top(WL);
8 Pop(WL);
9 snew := Summarise(m);
10 snew := {(x, y) ∈ snew | x, y 6∈ local(m)};
11 if snew 6= summary[m] then
12 summary[m] := snew;
13 foreach (m′,m) ∈ CG(P ) do
14 Add(WL,m′);
15 return summary;
First, all summary entries are initialised (line 5). Second, a work-list based pro-
cedure is applied to compute a fix-point (lines 6-14). Summaries are computed
calling procedure Summarise (line 9). At line 10, we discard pairs in which at
least one element is local to the current method m. Function local returns the set
of representatives corresponding to the local variables of the method taken as
argument. It is useless to keep elements referring to local variables in a summary
as they are invisible outside the method.
Summaries are updated until no new changes occur. This check is carried
out at line 11. If the summary of a method is updated then all its callers, need
to be analyzed again (lines 13 and 14). Recall that CG(P ) corresponds to the
call graph of program P (section 3). Hence, (m′,m) is a pair of caller and callee.
Finally, the summary map, which also represents a certificate, is returned.
More concretely speaking, algorithm Analyser, implements two fix-point it-
erations which are invoked hierarchically. The inner iteration is applied at the
method level by calling algorithm Summarise (Algorithm 2). Its role is to com-
pute an approximation of the flow relations over program variables induced by
the method m taken as argument. It proceeds by computing the transitive clo-
sure over elements from the domain D with respect to statements of m, applying
the transfer function F . We implement it as a standard iterative work-list proce-
dure. Fist, all locations are initialised with empty sets (lines 6 and 7) apart from
the initial location (line 8) with which the set of pairs of l-value representatives
(V ), in addition to sources and sinks, is associated. A fix-point computation is
then carried out (lines 10-18) where new facts are produced by simulating the
affect of program statements on input facts (line 15) . When the set of facts as-
sociated with a location is updated, all successor locations need to be considered
(lines 17-18). Once a fix-point is reached, the algorithm returns the set of facts
accumulated at the final location (line 19).
In the next section we describe the algorithm implementing the checker.
Algorithm 2: Summarise
Input: method M
Output: set of facts
1 Var list WL;
2 Var map IN , OUT ;
3 Let CFG be the control flow graph of m;
4 Let VM be the set of l-values appearing in M ;
5 foreach n ∈ node(CFG) do
6 IN [n] = {};
7 OUT [n] = {};
8 IN [init(CFG)] = {(R(x), R(x)) | x ∈ (V ∪ b(SR ∪ SK))};
9 WL := {init(CFG)};
10 while WL 6= ∅ do
11 n := Top(WL);
12 Pop(WL);
13 OUT0 := OUT [n];
14 IN [n] :=
⋃
OUT [n′] such that n′ ∈ pred(n);
15 OUT [n] := F (IN [n], stmt(n));
16 if OUT0 6= OUT [n] then
17 foreach n′ ∈ succ(n) do
18 Push(WL, n′);
19 return OUT [final(CFG)];
4.4 The checker
The checker component takes as input a program and certificate, and answers
whether the certificate is valid with respect to the input program. This is imple-
mented via procedure Checker (Algorithm 3). First, it extracts all methods in the
program (line 2). For each method it checks its presence in the certificate, which
corresponds to the first disjunct of the test at line 4. If this is not the case then
the certificate is invalid. Indeed, all methods of the program must have entries in
the certificate. This prevents circumventing the checker by only providing entries
for safe methods in the certificate. The second disjunct in the test (line 4) checks
if the actual computed summary corresponds to the one given by the certificate.
As we can see, certificate checking is linear in the number of methods as it is
done in a single pass (lines 3-5). Moreover, it has a constant memory complexity
as no additional information needs to be stored.
Algorithm 3: Checker
Input: Program P , Map (certificate) C
Output: Boolean
1 Var list L;
2 L := {methods of P};
3 foreach method m ∈ L do
4 if m 6∈ C ∨ Summarise(m) 6= C[m] then
5 return false;
6 return true;
4.5 Discussion
We discuss some aspects related to our analysis without deep diving into detail.s
Implicit Dependencies. The kind of dependencies treated in the previous
section are due to assignments. There exist indirect dependencies resulting from
conditional statements. Consider the following examples
y = 0; if (x > 0) {y = z;}.
If we just consider direct dependencies, we conclude that variable y only depends
on z. However, depending on whether variable x is positive or not, the value of y
may vary as the assignment inside the conditional may or may not be executed.
We say that there is a control or implicit dependency between x and y. Hence,
a sound approximation of dependencies of y must include both x and z. We use
a well-established approach proposed by Ferrante et al [15] to compute control
dependencies.
Handling Unavailable Code. One challenge we have faced is taking into ac-
count library calls. As the code is often unavailable, we need to over-approximate
the effect of library APIs on program variables. Our solution is similar to the one
adopted by Flowdroid [1]: we use two rules to model the effect of library calls.
The first rule assumes that the result of a method depends on its parameters
as well as the receiver object. The second rule assumes that the receiver object
depends on the method parameters. For example, for a method that appends a
character to a string, we have a rule modelling that the result depends on the
appended character.
Reflection. Reflection is a common obstacle to static analysis as it obfuscates
destinations of method invocations. It is impractical to naively consider all meth-
ods to which a potential call site may resolve. Some solutions were proposed in
the literature to deal with reflection [5]. We plan to investigate the combination
of such approaches with our technique.
5 Implementation and Experiments
We have implemented our approach in a tool called DCert, which is written in
Python and uses Androguard1 as front-end for parsing and decompiling Android
applications. It accepts Android applications in bytecode format (APK), so no
source code is required. One can simply download an app from a store of choice
and analyze it. As mentioned previously, DCert has two main components: An-
alyzer and Checker.
The analyzer takes as input an app and outputs an analysis report (flows
found) together with a certificate. The checker takes an application and a cer-
tificate as input, and answers whether the certificate is valid with respect to the
application taken as input.
We performed experiments on 13 real-world popular applications, from the
Google Play store2, ranging over different domains: communication, office, social,
etc. We use a typical Linux desktop in our experiments.
First, we apply the analyzer to an application and obtain a certificate. Then,
we invoke the checker on the same application in addition to providing the pre-
viously generated certificate as input. Results are illustrated in Table 2. Column
#Methods shows the number of methods per application as an indicator of the
application size. The two next columns provide the analysis and checking time.
They show times purely taken by the analysis and checking process. We do not
consider pre-processing, such as decompilation, etc. Column #Leaks provide the
number of data leaks from sources to sinks found by our analysis. Due to ap-
plication size and non-availability of source code, we did not investigate if the
current leaks represent a ground truth.
1 https://github.com/androguard
2 https://play.google.com/store/apps
Results show a significant difference between the analysis and checking time
in most of the cases. Checking can sometimes be more than 8 times faster as is
the case for the WhatsApp application.
As we think that there is a correlation between the application size (num-
ber of methods) and the gap between analysis and checking time, we further
investigate this hypothesis by applying our approach to 1070 apps randomly
collected from Androzoo3. Androzoo apps have various origins, including the
Google Play store which is the predominant source of most of the apps. Results
are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the analysis and checking time per ap-
plication in function of the number of methods. Dots in blue represent analysis
time and the ones in green correspond to checking time. We have two clusters,
and in each one, we clearly see that analysis time is higher than checking time.
Moreover, the gap between the two increases as application size gets larger. This
confirms our hypothesis and further supports our certification scheme proposal,
as applications tend to be larger and larger with new features added, backward
compatibly guarantees, etc.
App # Methods Analysis time (s) Checking time (s) # Leaks
Instagram 50754 386.37 65.75 2
Skype 42269 59.73 19.05 0
Firefox 43076 83.53 17.9 4
Uber 44875 125.75 67.69 4
Messenger 6139 11.2 3.73 0
Google Chrome 39182 101.19 24.68 2
Facebook 6012 11.17 3.58 0
Google Maps 37270 478.98 69.65 0
WhatsApp 47156 800.63 96.74 13
Acrobat Reader 40801 89.55 16.75 4
YouTube 52480 383.38 99.17 2
MicrosoftWord 47752 92.0 23.35 0
Viber 45232 94.22 19.68 1
Table 2: Analysis and Checking results for 13 popular apps from the Google Play
store.
6 Related Work
Our work is related to many topics: certification, taint analysis and Android
security. Along these axes we report on related work.
The idea of associating proofs with code was initially proposed by Necula
under the moniker Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [22, 23]. It was then used to
3 https://androzoo.uni.lu/
Fig. 3: Analysis (in blue) and checking (in green) times in function of method
number per application. Results for 1070 applications are included.
support resource policies for mobile code [2, 7]. Furthermore, Desmet et al. pre-
sented an implementation of PCC for the .NET platform [10]. While the tool
EviCheck [25,26] is also based on a similar idea and targets Android, it is unable
to analyse data-flow properties. Cassandra also applies PCC to Android [21].
Their approach proposes a type system to precisely track information flows.
While precision is an advantage, it is hard to assess the practicability of their
approach as no experiments involving real-world applications are reported. Our
approach is applicable to real-world large applications.
Taint analysis is a technique used in software security [1,11,17,28,30] to find
data leaks from some given sources to some given sinks. Our Analysis generates a
certificate which is not the case for the mentioned approaches. In addition, thanks
to our bottom-up inter-procedural, summaries computed via our technique are
context-independent. This allows verification re-use.
Android security is an active area of investigation, many tools for analyzing
security aspects of Android have emerged. Some rely on dynamic analysis [4,12,
24, 31, 32]. Other tools are based on static analysis [1, 3, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19]. We are
interested in the last category (static analysis) as our aim is to certify the absence
of bad behaviors. Our work is a complement to these tools as we are not only
interested in analyzing applications, but also to return a verifiable certificate
attesting the validity of the analysis result.
7 Conclusion and Further Work
We have presented a data-flow certification approach inspired by the proof-
carrying-code idea. It consists of splitting the verification process between a
heavyweight analyzer and a lightweight checker and using a certificate to ensure
trust between the two elements. We implemented our technique in a tool called
DCert and tested it on real-world applications. Results show that checking can
be up to 8 times faster than verification. Our finding suggests a potential for
deploying the checker on mobile devices which are limited in resources. This will
be the subject of our future investigations. We are not aware of any other tool
that implements a similar certification scheme and is scalable to real-world large
applications.
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